

## Introduction by Toufiq:

Today I have the honor of being Jakob's secret adviser to present Pr. Dr. Stefan Wild. I'm in the bad position to be his student, at least in my minor studies "Islamwissenschaften" at the University of Bonn. To talk as a student about your teacher is not that easy. In spite of that I'll try to say some introductory words.

Today Stefan is a new face for most of the people at the DAI in Heidelberg which he, when he first came in, read as "Deutsch-Archäologisches Institut" which is a great idea. Today we read DAI as "Die Akademie der interkulturellen Begegnungen – The academy of intercultural encounter". I also hope that Mr. Wild will not be in Heidelberg for the last time.

To present him maybe we should start in Heidelberg, where he spent a few semesters in the 60's and then left to continue elsewhere. His way brought him to Lebanon in a very critical time, in the 70's, and he came to know for me as Palestinian some very, very important figures in modern Arab and especially Palestinian thinking. One of Stefan's greatest books is about Razam Kanafami, a poet who has been assassinated by the Israelis at the age of 36. A person, whom history would give birth to every hundred or 70 years. That's not all, you could ask Mr. Wild to explain to us: what does *Amshit* or *Ogaritm* mean in Semitic, in Hetie languages? But Stefan would also tell us a lot about the history, the interpretation and the textual nature of the Qur'an. He would tell us why the Homza is so important to be read in the Qur'an, or to be interpreted. He would also build bridges between Turks, Arabs, Persians, whoever for the Islamic communities living in Germany.

When I made my exams at Prof. Wild's department, I worked on the topic of the Arab enlightenment of Jalaludin Afghani and at that time I was teaching at the University and I expected that he would ask me about those people but Stefan asked the question: "How do you see the relationship between (at that time – in the 80's) the young emerging Palestinians in the occupied territories and those people?" "I don't know", I was able to answer and I passed. So today we are asking Prof. Wild the question how he sees the challenges the Muslim world has to face within globalization.

## Prof. Dr. Stefan Wild:

Thank you very much, Toufiq, for these kind words. I'm afraid my paper marks in a way the middle of this day, it doesn't, of course, as far as the number of presentations is concerned, but somehow lunch is the midday meal. So I feel in the middle of this event and there is also an Arabic saying which says: "Kheyrol Ahwale Usatehan - the best position of all is in the middle". I think this is certainly not true for this kind of presentation. I feel that everybody would sort of like to have a siesta and we have had a nice lunch and my task is to wake you up.

Let me start by picking up a remark of Nasr Abu Zayd which has also been elaborated upon by others. I must confess that I, about 10 years ago I made a vow, I said I will never attend a conference, let alone speak in any conference, the title of which is "Islam and anything", "Islam and x", "Islam and modernity", "Islam and tolerance", "Islam and civil society", "Islam and the west", finally "Islam and globalization". Now as you can see, I've broken this vow. But I think one should be careful of these kind of conjunctions, they are really a trap and the best example of this kind of trap is another conjunction which is used very, very often in a totally innocent way, and that's the conjunctions Jews and Arabs. I mean you can open up any newspaper and you'll find it. And everybody at some level knows that there's something wrong with this Jewish religion. The Arabs speak a language and everybody knows the Arabs are speaking Jews. But still, the conjunction Jews and Arabs, which doesn't make sense, is still upheld and kept not only by the media, but also by various respected scholars and in very respected scholarly output.

I think the events in Holland have been mentioned and the way you put what happened there in Amsterdam could be very revealing to this topic. The presence of Muslims in Europe is something, which has a relationship to globalization. We all know that Muslims had been in Europe long before globalization started, but at this date there is a relationship between the presence of Muslims in Europe and it's a presence which is going to stay. Nobody in his right mind will think that at some stage Europe will be without Muslims anymore. It is unthinkable. And what did happen in Amsterdam? Did a Muslim kill a Christian? Or did one Dutchman kill another Dutchman? The way you put this, the way you frame it, says a lot about what you're going to answer and I just wanted to alert you to the fact that these conjunctions, with an "n" in the middle, which seem so simple and so common and so self-evident, they are in many ways a trap. And it's the same thing with our topic "Islam and globalization"

Let me make another introductory remark. The fear of terror and terrorism sometimes makes for a very strange vocabulary. A short time ago I read an article in the *New York Times* which carried a report that the FBI did not have enough experts on, and I quote: "languages commonly associated with terrorism". One does not need much imagination to assume that these languages must be, you know, Arabic, Persian, Farsi, Pashtu, Urdu maybe. And remembering that all these languages use the Arabic alphabet one might conclude that there is also a writing system associated to terrorism. Now, if you were looking for a religion commonly associated with terrorism, the answer would be easy. Few people, at least in Europe and the United States, would hesitate to consider Muslim inheritance of a terror-related religion. This fear I suggest is also the reason why so many of us are here today present. There is an element of fear in this. And if I look at my colleagues here, I don't know whether this has been mentioned, two of the participants of this colloquium, Al Azm and Souroush, received last week in Amsterdam the respected Erasmus Prize for their work on the topic "Islam and Modernity", another one of these traps. The third person was Fatima Mernissi from Morocco, who is not here today. She could give a touch of gender neutrality to this all male team. And as you all know, the conferment of this Erasmus Prize was over-shadowed by politically motivated violence. As you know, a deep political, cultural and intellectual crisis has swept the Netherlands as a result of this murder. Mosques and Muslim as well as Christian schools were burnt and I'm afraid that such a development could happen elsewhere in Europe, almost everywhere in Europe.

And it is clear to me that at least the presence of Muslims in Europe has something to do with globalization and that's the justification of this short paper.

I take this topic in Islamic globalization as a two folding meaning and let me suggest something to my friends here in Heidelberg: sometimes it's useful not to talk about Islam, but to talk about Muslims. Now, this has already been mentioned and I think it's very easy and it does make a difference, because if you say "Islam and something" you presuppose that there is a block of something called Islam. And another thing: when you say Muslims you have to ask yourself immediately: where are these Muslims? In Indonesia, in South-Africa, in Germany, in Turkey, I mean, which Muslims are you talking about? And which historical period are you talking about? Are you talking about the time of the prophet or are you talking about the present day? So if you are obliged to say what you really mean by Islam, by replacing the word Islam by the word Muslims you have already advanced a small step. So I take this topic "Muslims and globalization" as two folding meaning. There is first the challenge of modernity and globalization facing Muslims around the globe. And there is second the modern non-Muslim world facing the globalized Islam. And in both cases I'm afraid the conjunction end is not neutral, but it suggests some kind of a threat.

I think today, maybe more than at any other time in history, societies, cultures, civilizations, religions have to negotiate with each other the space allotted to each of them in the present world. And this present world is characterized by two contradictory tendencies. The first tendency leads to a world without borders, electronic communications, streams of international capital, migrants looking for work. All these things transgress all national and cultural boundaries. This is a tendency towards a single world space, a tendency towards globalization. The second tendency is exactly the opposite. It conserves and enforces a world in which men and women live under widely diverging social and economic circumstances and confined to manifold conflicting creeds, ideologies and locally determined patterns of conduct. This road leads to a multitude of cultural spaces and insists on resisting the first globalizing tendency. Both tendencies can be observed in the first decade of this century.

And economists who normally have little regard for the beauty of language have coined a very ugly word: globalization, blending the global with the local and emphasizing the need to blend local values into universally distributed products. Now, I will try to avoid this ugly word, because it's really very ugly, but I have to admit that it contains some element of truth. If we single out religion as a factor influencing and shaping human behavior, one thing I think must be clear from the start, religion is never and has never been the only factor in shaping human behavior, and very often it is suggested that in Islam with Muslims this is somehow different – it is not, human behavior is only partly shaped by religious authority, by religious teaching.

On the other hand, human individual and collective behavior cannot be understood as a simple cause effectuation between certain social economic data and human reaction to it. It is impossible to differentiate human culture from ethics, morality and the quest for a sense of life that is from religion. This is true for all religions, including Islam, Christianity, Judaism, you name it. And the thesis of this paper is that different religions, different cultures, different Weltanschauungen, if you permit me this Germanic word, different ideologies in our world can only negotiate with each other in a global space of modernity. This space cannot be and will never be under the complete control of one specific ideology, of one specific culture, of one specific religion. And one can call this space transreligious or transcultural in the sense that it must be open to all religions, cultures and ideologies.

I have a problem in calling this, in an Arab-Islamic context, secularized because the term secularized carries a heavy historical burden, so I will avoid this term. And I may say in passing that I will not only speak about Arabic Muslims, but mainly because it's the field I know best, but I will mention also Indonesia.

Now, what I want to present to you is basically in three parts. I will give you a very short hand version of the history of globalization and please don't forget that I'm not an economist and not a historian of economy. And I will then try to present to you some debates on globalization within Arab intellectual circles and I will then, if there's time ask the question: what does education mean in this context? A topic like Islamic civilization, Muslim civilization, globalization makes one very prone to generalizations. I will, like I said, concentrate on the Muslim-Arab civilization, I will refer to it as something living, not as something which has, you know, happened in antiquity and this is important because a common fallacy of the wide field of what is called the Muslim-European, Arab-European dialogue, a common fallacy is at least in my mind and my experience frequently a praise of the past. It is not uncommon and I have been in several of these meetings where speakers of all backgrounds agreed on praising the great cultural achievements of Islamic civilization in bygone eras. And one of the foremost of these past achievements, of course, is the Andalusian experience, which culminated in what is now seen as Andalusian peaceful coexistence of Jews, Christians and Muslims under Muslim-Arab rule, a coexistence which as you know ended in 1492 with the fall of Granada to the catholic 'reconquista'. While trying to narrow down the subject I have to open it up on another account. The Islamic - Arabic civilization, as Sadek Al Azm has already remarked, is at present within world Islam in a minority position. Arabic as the language of the Muslim Holy Book still guarantees a certain cultural dominance and a certain prestige of Arab intellectuals - I am sorry Nasr, you also, you mainly made this point. Certain Arab countries and states played and play the dominant economic role symbolized by patrol. But the Arab-Muslim experience is not anymore the unquestioned unity, which it may have been in the early centuries of Islam. Other Islamic civilizations have evolved, the Indonesian one, the Indian one, the Turkish one, but also the South African one where in South Africa Muslims are a tiny minority, maybe one or two percent, but they have a very interesting South African Muslim theology. Most probably there is also already a French and a British one and some time there may be even a European Muslim Identity. It is next to impossible to treat all these different cultural forms in which Muslims live as one unity. They do not share a common history and a common social environment. They do share or at least may share the same holy texts and the same holy rights. But this development, which is a phenomenon of globalization, may be seen as a challenge or even a threat by some Muslims. This is why in Germany for instance the concept of an Euro-Islam, of a European Islam as a separate entity is hotly debated within the German Muslim commu-

nity - or one should say German Muslim communities.

Now let me give you a sort of birds-eye view on the history of globalization, this all what I am telling you now is not something which I have developed, but I am referring to and I am relying on a secondary literature. For everybody interested in the Arab debate, within the Arabs I can recommend an article by a colleague, an Egyptian colleague, who is teaching at the Berlin Free University, Hamad Am Sawi, who has written an extensive article on the globalization debate in the Arab world. Now most people would suggest that there is a sort of a pre-globalization era starting from the fourteenth century. In the beginning of the seventeenth century and the nineteenth century Europe wide with the Ottoman Empire and expansions at that time were often religiously tinted - Islam, European Christianity. The Chinese expansion colonized large areas in central Asia, and in Europe this period pre-national and national states emerged counterbalanced by supra - or infra national networks. The growing pre-occupation with natural sciences, commercial interests diminished the importance of national and sub-national borders. And at the same time, the best example, the British Empire, in the British Empire the penetration exploitation of territories overseas coincided more or less with the advent of industrialization. The begin of globalization proper is often dated around 1850, rapid expansion of nation states, large areas of industrialization almost irresistible in many places but uneven. And at the same time large parts of the globe fell under colonial domination. In Europe the nationalist trend coexisted with universalizing, if competitive tendency in the industry and the natural sciences. In the period of the two world wars, peaceful competition ceases to exist. World War One was the first European war, World War Two is often called the first global war. In the post war era after 1945, an era of decolonization, the number of newly founded independent states grew rapidly, industrialization, mass communication, mass consumption of industrial products and the rise of new colonialism mark the beginning of the latest, maybe latest state of globalization. On the one hand the world seems to shrink down to a global village, on the other hand the same tendency gave rise to a multitude of powerful counter movements. And I take as my working hypothesis that globalization in its present, possibly mature state is indeed a mega-trend in contemporary history. It has come to us firstly as a consequence of economic neo-liberalism imposed by the most powerful global players. Capital markets are liberalized, state-run enterprises are privatized or re-privatized, internal markets are open for free international competition, multi - and transnational conglomerates control many markets. Those who advocate globalization usually call for liberalization of these markets. The reason is, they argue, that liberalization of the markets will bring new jobs, and new jobs will bring new prosperity. Prosperity where and for whom? On this point there is disagreement. The globalization has secondly produced a worldwide network of scientific and technological communication, and in a way our meeting here is a documentation of this. Distances of space and time can be bridged with a click of the mouse, floods of information flow in seconds around the globe. There is certainly a new era of mass communication. The internet is potentially present and accessible in every house, or at least in each internet café. Globalization has thirdly far-reaching consequences for all cultures and civilizations and therefore also for religious beliefs. The consequences of this threefold globalization are economic, they are political and they are cultural. One important result is that borders of states in the long run cannot stop globalization. Nation states become increasingly transnational. By losing meaningful borders these states run the risk of losing at the same time parts of their sovereignty. National independence becomes weaker, transnational interdependence becomes stronger.

As far as I can see, one can distinguish three main scholarly positions of political scientists towards globalization. There is a strong globalization theory, which finds radical effects of globalization around the globe. Globalization according to this theory will limit and may destroy the ability of the national state to control its economy and its social standards. This position is taken by neo-liberals as well as by skeptical observers from the left side of the political spectrum. Weak hypothesis secondly of globalization maintains that often shrinking margins for state activities are mainly the result of domestic conditions or enditions factors. And a third school of thoughts adheres to a very differentiated picture of globalization and according to this hypothesis, numerous patterns of change and adjustment can be observed, adjustments to the requirements of a globalized world and adjustment to the globalization in process to regional, national, subnational patterns of economics and politics.

I don't think there's any doubt that many aspects of economic globalization put the poorest of the world's population at great risk. These risks normally do not follow national borders. India, for example, produces a great number of internationally needed IT-Software specialists and is at the same time an area of mass poverty. Economic liberalism on a global level tends to disintegrate into social Darwinism: adjust or die ; the fittest will survive. And it may come, maybe to some of you as a surprise that the Middle East according to many political scientists ranks very low on all globalization indices. Compared to other world regions the process of globalization has yet to encompass the Middle East. This is Beck in a famous book about globalization. The indices of globalization used in Beck's study are three important ways of boundary crossing phenomena. The spread of internet hosts the growth of exports and the development of direct foreign investment. And the data collected by Beck shows that the Middle East is highly resistant to globalization in the fields of communication, trade and economics. The resistance to globalization is attempted and is put up by not entirely democratic regimes, is partly the result of decisions of these regimes, which aim at preserving this authoritarian order and system.

Now I come to my second part. It's a very short overview of the Arabic debate on globalization. My main source is Hamzavi, as I said and in this case like in the case of modernity, civil society, democracy one is not in just by summing up the position of the Arab intellectuals, who discussed this, I'm not talking about Arab intellectuals, not necessarily Muslim intellectuals. I think they are people who are for it, people who are radically against it and there is a sort of uncomfortable medium position which argues that there are some advantages and some disadvantages. Now, this is of course very formal but it gives you basically an idea of what is happening and whereas the opposition to globalization comes very often from a strange sort of alliance between Marxists, leftists, as far as they are left in the Arab world, and very conservative Muslims. The liberal position is a position which is an uncomfortable position in between the rejection and acceptance.

Let me give you only one example because I'm afraid I'm running out of time. An example of the pessimistic view of globalization. This pessimistic view can be expressed in religious terms, it can also be expressed in non-religious cultural terms. For many Arab intellec-

tuals Muslims and non-Muslims alike globalization means commercialization of all aspects of human life combined with extreme and probably irreversible ecological harm and a rapidly growing disparity between North and South. S. Amin, who is a well known Egyptian economist, attacks the majors of advocated by an instrument of globalization like the world bank by saying, what the world bank calls structural adjustment to globalization, is a potential economic general side. Now this is a very strong position. Many Arab intellectuals and many Muslim intellectuals, religious and secular writers share this view: globalization is a danger ; it's very dangerous. And as far as the leftists are concerned, I think in the last instance this may be well indebted to Marxist dogma that modern capitalism is an omnipotent, irresistible player that will devour everything else, until it is replaced by something else. As far as the cultural side of globalization is concerned the picture may not be less leak. I quote a distinguished Arab scientist and writer as the Egyptian Sharif Hatata: "to expend the global market, increase the number of consumers, make sure that they buy what is sold, develop needs that conform to what is produced and develop the fever of consumerism, culture must play a role in developing certain values, patterns of behavior, visions of what is happiness and success in the world, attitudes towards sex and love. Culture must model a global consumer". And that is very critical in a very critical way. This essentially defensive attitude usually equates globalization with Americanization. And my impression is that for many Muslims and non-Muslims as well in the Middle East one of the most threatening aspects of globalization in the sense of Americanization is the issue of sex. Religious and social taboos are strongest here. Any social change, any cultural change in this area is broadly resented and deeply feared. Central European and United States society are no exceptions, as can be seen for instance in the present discussion of gay marriage in the United States. Basically this is the same issue. This attitude of general refusal and general rejection is criticized by others as a self-defeating mood of cultural pessimism. One of the critics, if I may quote him, is Al-Azm, who diagnoses a kind of cultural schizophrenia and says: "this is a tragedy of unending hesitations and waverings between the old and the new and between identity and modernity". And this, in many ways indeed the discussion of globalization, is exactly the same discussion as far as Muslims and modernity, Muslims and democracy, Muslims and civil society, it's exactly the same discussion. Very often it's the same people who express the same views about these issues. The reason of this dramatic view of things is according again to Al-Azm, I quote him: "as Arabs and Muslims we continue deep down to image ourselves as conquerors, as makers of history, as pacesetters, pioneers and leaders of world-historic-proportions, in the marrow of our bones we still sense ourselves as suspects of history, not as its objects, as its agent not as its patient".

In a furor of cultural self-victimization and arsenic disdain for the process of globalization, the dominant cultural Arabic discourse makes globalization a code for every evil besetting the Arab world. Another scholar, Sonja B., teaching in Berlin, explained that this kind of rejection which Sharif Hatata advocates implies that people, in this case Arabs and Muslims, have no choice while acting like they do. But she argues that very often they do have a choice and this is especially easy to see in cultural affairs and her example is, and I think it's a very nice example although maybe completely unexpected, she says: it sounds rather trivial if you have a wedding and you want to decide which music is going to play at this wedding you can play Elvis Presley or Cheb Khaled? And this is a choice which you can make and it is immediately clear that the Arabic version is, first, not Muslim and then it's not something classical, it's a completely new kind of music, it's if you want, a hybrid music, it's a mixture of many things. But it's not Western culture either. So, in the field of popular music you can see this very clearly what globalization means. It's not a choice between old and new, between classical and non-classical or Muslim and non-Muslim. They're completely new choices, which appear. Therefore, she argues, globalization in the realm of culture does not necessarily mean impoverishment and unification. In the cultural field at least there can be serious losses caused by globalization, but there can also be significant gains.

I will skip, and I think you will be grateful for this, too, chapters and I come to my concluding remark. I think one of the reasons why we are here and I think this came out very nicely this morning. An aspect of what we are trying to do, has to give some kind of even preliminary answer of what can we do, I mean we're not only here to discuss something and then go home, but we would like to have some sort of a formula which could govern our behavior. And I want to submit the following proposal: it is, if we look at the area of the co-existence between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe and this is an issue in all the European societies. I think it would be a very good idea to not only look at the things that fail and at the things which do not succeed. And we have for instance the Netherlands, long before Turkish workers came and the Moroccan workers came, and now they are Dutch people of Moroccan descent and Turkish descent and who have a Dutch passport. Before this influx there was the influx of Indonesian Muslims coming from the Dutch colonies in Indonesia and, as far as I know, this co-existence in Holland is not an issue anymore. It's old, it's there. The Indonesian Muslims as far as they are in Holland, are integrated and of course they stick to their kind, but they're a peaceful co-existence, it seems to me, I'm not a specialist on this subject. So, why did this co-existence work? And this is maybe a more fruitful approach than constantly to ask: why doesn't it work in some cases. I don't know the answer, but it might be illuminating to find it out and a second example, which is maybe even more controversial, is the United States. There are a lot of things in the United States, which are to be criticized especially in their foreign policy. But somehow they have managed to avoid major catastrophes of this inter-communal violence. How did they do that? That might help us to govern our own behavior.

Thank you very much for your attention.