

Prof. Udo Steinbach

Introduction:

After a long day of lectures, ideas and reflections on what we call: Islam and democracy, all these values which we talked about, now is the turn for

Prof. Udo Steinbach. Udo Steinbach has the divine talent to bring contradictions together. I think he is more famous than to be introduced. Nearly everybody of us here knows him either through the orient institute in Hamburg or through his medial role in Germany as a bridge to the Islam world or to the Muslim world. Thank you.

Prof. Udo Steinbach:

Well, this is the first time I hear that I'm bringing people together. In normal life people say I'm polarizing them. But this time I should try my best to point out a couple of things which are very much in line with what has been said before. Of course everybody feels in this room that being the last speaker is a very difficult thing. Fatigue is very obvious and many things that I'm going to say have been said before but probably from another point of view and in a different context.

So, first of all, of course, it's a strange subject on what I have to talk, the German view, talking about Islam and democracy, the German view, I think, rightly we have emphasized that this is something the Muslims have to discuss among themselves. So, then what is the German view? We are quite distant and not directly concerned. I ask myself: what is the meaning of all that? And then I thought that the least thing which may be sure is that it is pars pro toto, that I have been asked not to talk about a German view, but an European view. In any case, what I'm going to talk about now is not an inside position, the way we have heard before but it's a position from outside. In fact, I think, and I very closely can follow on what Al-Azm said to an certain extent, Soroush as well. There are a couple of reasons to figure out what the European view of the relationship between Islam and democracy may be.

The first thing is, as Al-Azm has said, it's this Turkish debate. The debate which had been over the last two or three years very much in a cultural context I'm not discussing anymore economy to some extent Copenhagen criteria but as all know we have been discussing the question whether Turkey having an Islamic Muslim identity would be compatible with Christian occidental tradition. In all seriousness. And it's not just the politicians of some right parties, the CDU or the CSU, but you have a couple of very, very serious colleagues who insisted that Turkey completely due to Islamic tradition is incompatible with secular democratic Europe. So it has to stay outside and that's of course the point we have to ask.

The second thing and this is directly related to it, is the fate of Muslim migrants in European societies. Once we declare Turkey to be incompatible with a secular European Europe then I would think it's quite logical to assume that this applies for Muslims in general. That basically the fact that they are Muslims would make them incompatible with the basics of a western European secular society. Again, is that correct? My vote is clear but it's a subject which is being discussed. So the question of Islam and democracy directly concerns us. And, of course, the discussion about Van Gogh's assassination in Holland which brought up quite a number of people who would say that you see it and the day before yesterday it was on page two in *Die Welt*. That "Shari'a" is basically compelling to violence, incompatible with democracy. And that was page two in "Die Welt". So the question concerns us.

And the last point is: what sort of lessons did we learn of September 11th? Are we going along with the United States with the same agenda of violence, war on terrorism or do we have a different view as how to approach the Islamic world? How to jointly solve problems whether they are social problems, whether they are political problems, economic problems or other problems? How can we come jointly to solutions? That means: is there any sort of common values which we share basically here in the European Union and the Arab world?

What I'm going to put forward are a couple of fairly unrelated remarks, not of a theoretical nature but a little bit practical. I'm not touching the questions we have been discussing in the morning while we were talking about Islam and democracy, not talking about, which would indeed be a very fascinating subject, Christianity and democracy. For example if the Pope had applied for, by the end of the 19th century, to become a member of the European Union. One would have rejected the Vatican due to the lack of Copenhagen criteria. So it would be a very fascinating thing to discuss not only Islam and democracy but Christianity and democracy. Why are we talking about Islam and democracy and then the west? Why in one instance we are using a religious connotation and when it comes to us we are using a secular connotation? I'm not going to discuss this.

Let me start my various observations which I'm going to put forward with a question. The question is: when did they United States lose the Middle East? Or: when did they United States lose the Islamic world? My answer would be: that was when the first American tanks showed up in front of the Iraqi oil ministry in order to protect the Iraqi oil ministry and the first looters at the same time left the Iraqi national museum. That was when it became obvious that the scheme of the United States to transform the Middle East into some sort western style democracy failed.

Once you think about Iraq and you plan to administer the Iraqi economy it is absolutely essential to have the documents in the ministry of oil. But once, on the other hand, you plan to participate in changing a society, changing a political system and you are not aware that you need documents as well and the documents are in the national museum. If that doesn't come to your mind, you fail. If you want to participate in planning the future, a democratic future, changing the society, yes, probably even the majority of the people would be with you. But once you exclude their identity as being the basic fact when you charge to shape the future then you are lost. And that brings me, in a very impressionistic way to the subject I'm going to deal. If we are talking about democracy in the Muslim world, it should be at the end a synthesis. A synthesis in the way Abdulkarim Soroush has mentioned. A synthesis between modernity on one hand and modernity includes human rights, respect of law, democracy whether you call it democracy or whether you call it otherwise. I'm going to come back to that in a moment. This is one side and the heritage religion understood in an intelligent way. In a way compatible with the

21st century if you plan to have that sort of democracy in Muslim countries then it has to be a synthesis and you cannot import a western style, a blueprint, American blueprint to the area and think that this is going to create new stable political orders.

I'm not going to talk systematically but a little bit in an impressionistic way. I would like to stress the point, to illustrate the point I just was making about a synthesis and something different by alluding to a very, very small passage, just a few lines, in the gigantic Arab human development report of 2003. It's a very impressive document as all of you know and it got a lot of praise in the west that for the first time the Muslims, the Arabs realize in what bad shape they are. But then they admitted that there are failures, that there are shortcomings in terms of education, in terms of regimes and so on and so forth. And they very strongly come out in changing the regimes in order to improve the overall situation in the Arab world, for example in terms of education. So, there is this small passage just in the running text when we are talking about the regimes and why the regimes in the Arab world systematically prevented the Arab world from getting educated. And what did it mean, just like that. They simply put the question: what is the Arab word for government? It's *hokuma*. And all of us in this room we know how Arab words are being shaped. You have three consonants as radicals of the word and you put the vowels in a different way among them. So you have *hkm*, *hokuma* means government. Not only Arabia but in Persia as well. And *hükümet* in Turkey. You can pronounce it in a different way. Instead of *hokuma* for government you can say *hakim* it's the same *hkm* and *hakim* means the wise, the doctors. You again can put it in a different way and all of a sudden it means *hekma*, which means wisdom. So what they simply say without commenting it talking about regime change and how bad the regimes are and what sort of new political order one needs in the Middle East. They simply allude to the fact that *hokuma* may have something to do with wisdom and wisdom is synonymous more or less with justice. But when they put it forward they mean wisdom, they mean justice not in a simply secular way, but in the way Abdulkarim Soroush was putting forward. In one way or another wisdom and justice have to be put into relationship with religion. So what they simply say without saying it expressis verbis is that we're talking about change, changes needed in order to develop the Arab world, but which way? It's up to us with must not necessarily the idealistic western style liberal democracy. It can be a largely different type of state and system and regime, which in a way is a change as far as the present regimes are concerned, but it must not be necessarily a western style democracy. Essential is that the individual man is protected against the state. And there are many, many ways how you can protect the individual man against the state and that is the problem. It's not the lack of democracy in the Middle East, the problem is really that the regimes, the governments, all the time control the individual, and that is why people are backward. But this "how to protect the man against the state in order to secure human rights against the state", can be done in a lot of ways, at least without putting forward details. That's what the authors of this Arab human development report in this small footnote do have in mind.

So I'm not going to talk about the history of the notion of democracy in the Muslim world or in the Arab world. To the best of my knowledge this discussion started sometime at the end of the sixties, beginning of the seventies with the end of the liberal age, so to speak, when the secular development paradigmata failed politically, economically and so on and so forth after the disaster of June 1967. People tried to figure out different paradigms. The notion of democracy came into view and the answers which have been given at the beginning were quite insufficient and we heard about a lot especially this afternoon that at first democracy was put in the context of Islam. Democracy only would function, the only way to establish democracy in the Arab world would be, and that's a large literature, to materialize it, to put it into the framework of Nizam Asami, of an Islamic order based on Shari'a.

This fills entire walls of books and talking about Shura and all the things we heard about Baia making Shura, which is consultation and equivalent to parliament, talking about the equality of people, as all of them are Muslims and under Muslim law. But right from the beginning there was, as far this paradigm was concerned, this tension between Shari'a on one hand and basic ingredients of democracy on the other hand. For example elections, what do you know, to what extent do you need elections once you have the Islamic law as the basis of the state? To what extent do you need political parties? Political parties only would split the consensus based on Shari'a. And then we had this notion and I very much remember the discussion we had with our Iranian friends and Abdulkarim Soroush was among them in 1992, he was alluding to. But we were talking about human rights and democracy between some Germans and the Iranian colleagues when one of the Iranian colleagues said: it's not the notion of right, it's the notion that the state which is based on the Shari'a, it grants the human rights. It's not right but you can claim as an individual but the state which is perfect as is being based on Shari'a, it presents it, it grants it to the citizen and, of course, behind it was the lack of notion of sovereignty of the people.

If we look at a couple of draft constitutions, which have been prevented by the Muslim brothers and other Islamic parties, you can see as far as the basic rights are concerned, human rights, civic rights, they're not very well established and why in an Islamic constitution should you protect the individual against the state? The state is the agent which is right all the time, it's based on Shari'a. And if you are a human being protesting against something which is being done by the state, it's your fault. That's why they are so far away from how the way we understand a democratic constitution and the democratic way of protecting the individual, the citizen, against the state.

I have to come back, as it was for the first time materialized in the Islamic republic of Iran, to this struggle among modernity, among democracy on one hand as one basic element of modernity, with religion. That was institutionalized for the first time and they claimed it, and I come back to that in a minute, with the Islamic revolution and with the constitution, which was discussed and then voted on in 1979 or early 1980.

Now I just give you an idea quoting from the constitution of the Islamic republic, I do it in German, I know that Abdulkarim Soroush knows what I'm talking about, I'm sorry I didn't have time to translate this in English,

Article 2: Die islamische Republik ist eine Ordnung auf der Grundlage des Glaubens an den einen Gott, die göttliche Offenbarung, die Gerechtigkeit Gottes, das Imamat, seine stete Führung und seine fundamentale Rolle beim Fortgang der Revolution oder (or in the sense which I have put forward) alle Gesetze und Vorschriften in Zivil- und Strafrecht, Finanzwesen, Wirtschaft, Verwaltung, Kultur, Militär, Politik, etc. müssen sich nach islamischen Maßstäben richten.

Or article 5, concerning the Velayat-e Faqih:

Während der Abwesenheit der Herrn der Zeit obliegt in der islamischen Republik die allgemeine Sachwahrung und die Leitung der Gemeinschaft demjenigen islamischen Rechtsgelehrten, der gerecht, gottesfürchtig, mit Bewußtsein für die Probleme der Zeit, Mut und Führungsqualitäten ausgestattet und umsichtig ist und den die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung in seiner Führung anerkannt und akzeptiert hat.

So how can we understand this experiment of an Islamic republic? Between exactly what I mentioned, between on one hand modernity, on the other hand religion or heritage or however you call it.

And again I quote for he did it in a very, very, precise and impressive way, he tried, at least, he tried to put it forward. Mr. Mohammed Khatami when he came to Weimar in the summer of 2000. In this summer he went to Weimar and there was a discussion with Hans Küng and the German president and one of our orientalist colleagues. And then he inaugurated the sort of monument for the dialogue, two empty chairs: on one Hafiz is supposed to sit, on the other one Goethe. What Mr. Khatami said in terms of justifying the historical place of the Islamic republic as an experiment, it was the following way: he precisely took it in between the tension between tradition and modernity. He said, and again I quote him in German: "Wir können uns weder der Tradition noch der Moderne unterwerfen, aber auch nicht die Eine der Anderen opfern." Die Errichtung der islamischen Republik sieht Mohammed Khatami im Lichte der Lösung des Spannungsverhältnisses von Moderne und Tradition und ich zitiere ihn noch einmal: "Die neue religiös gesellschaftliche Ordnung im Iran wurde etabliert, um auf die sich immer erneuernden Bedürfnisse und Fragestellungen des heutigen Menschen Antworten zu finden. Khomeini habe sowohl auf der Erhaltung der Grundlagen der Religion, als auch auf der Erhaltung der Rolle des Volkes gestanden."

Here you see what he means. He sees the Islamic republic as a sort of modernizing experiment trying to synthesize modernity, democracy, participation of the people after the revolution on one hand and religion on the other hand. And now what we see since ten years, or even more than ten years, is the way how people are claiming, and Mr. Khatami himself trying to take the lead in changing to some extent not the constitution but the appearance, the facade of the Islamic republic. And as we saw in the elections of September 20th 2004 this experiment obviously failed, it led to nowhere. We have a parliament and it has been said already, the Majlis in Tehran, which is quite a lively thing and we had it dominated by modernized of the last four or five years. So they had big intentions to change the society, but they failed for above you have Ayatollah Khamenei, who is the representative of the system, a religious figure and side by side to parliament you have the expert council, the guardian council, which says that whatever the parliament is deciding, at this agency the guardian council is not being elected so it has to be said whether it's compatible with Iran in the guardian council. All those things or most of the very progressive legislation which the Majlis tried to put forward was canceled and put down by the expert-, by the guardian council. So you see this is a problem. You want to have democracy and the people want to have democracy and even the president wants to have democracy. But at the end, they completely failed. The guardian council on the eve of the elections of February 20th of this year they canceled the participation of more than 2000 people. So before the people elected their parliament it was the guardian council, put aside everybody who could constitute a danger to the conservative part of the regime. So what's going to happen? Obviously, it seems that this way of Perestroika, I consider it an Islamic attempt at Perestroika, that you try to change the facade as in the Soviet Union but pretend, but conserve the basics and that collapsed, the Soviet Union collapse was going to happen with the Islamic republic. You cannot just change the facade and at the same time keep the basics. The Islamic constitution with Velayat-e Faqih going on. What is going to be the consequence? Is Mr. Khatami going to become another Islamic Iranian Gorbachev? And I think from that point of view the future of the Islamic republic in terms of democracy, the people do want something different from the present system, definitely. How is it going to work? We shall see.

And I once more quote Mr. Khatami, who even after the elections of February 20th 2004, he stuck to his idea and I quote him on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Islamic revolution in February this year. He said: "Demokratie in einem islamischen Rahmen sei der beste Kurs für das Land. Diejenigen, die einen westlichen Stil von Säkularismus wollen, werden nicht nur die Unabhängigkeit, sondern auch die historische Identität der iranischen Nation auf's Spiel setzen. Und diejenigen, die die Demokratie unter dem Deckmantel des Islam untergraben, stellen eine ähnliche Bedrohung dar und riskieren die junge Generation zu entfremden, wofür ich immer gestanden habe und stehen werde, ist die dritte Option: Demokratie im Rahmen der Religion, vereinbar mit unserer Geschichte und Kultur." And we shall see whether this is going to work out. Obviously, there is a problem, there is a basic contradiction.

And here I'm really glad, all the time I see Abdulkarim Sorouh. When we discussed things in Hamburg or in Tehran, I remember him once saying that human rights and democracy is the greatest challenge to Islam. Will they make them compatible with Islam? And that was what he was talking about before, when he was talking about maximalists and minimalists. But who says, between those maximalists and minimalists, where to put a democratic system? Can you reform Islam and how can you establish a bridge between on one hand Islam, whatever sort of Islam, and on the other hand the realities of the 21st century, part of which is democracy.

In any case, what that means and what that shows and that's why I mentioned the American tanks in front of the Iraqi ministry of oil. It means, once you are thinking about democratizing parts of the Muslim world, it has to come from within, it has to come from the people. They have to find out what the best sort of system is for them in order to fulfill the basic requirement, which is to protect people, to protect the individual against the state.

Just a view remarks when it comes to this complex relationship between so-called Islam and democracy at certain instances and certain places in the Muslim world. These are internal factors, but obviously there are external factors as well when it comes to the question how democracy is going to perform. And that, of course, has a lot to do with the Americans, with the American president announcing that he will bring democracy to the Middle East. Ladies and gentlemen, that's fine. And most of the people themselves they want it, they want change. As I said, not necessarily as a blueprint to western concepts, but they basically want change whether you go to Morocco or

whether you come to Iran or elsewhere, even Saudi Arabia as we notice these days. But when it comes from the Americans people immediately think, well the guy's talking about democracy, what does he really want? They don't trust him and if an American president is talking about democracy people think, what is the real agenda? And that goes back, as has been said this morning already, to August 1953 when we had a sort of democratic nationalist regime in Tehran, Mohammed Mossadeq was in power by that time, and he was elected. But then in August 1953 the CIA staged the coup against the elected regime of Mohammed Mossadeq, toppled it and brought the Shah back and since then started the new dominating system. What was the crime of Mohammed Mossadeq? His crime was that he nationalized Iran oil industry and that was against American interest. That was sufficient in order to topple a by the time democratically elected man and to reestablish the Shah. And there, of course, is a direct link between the events of August 1953 and the Islamic revolution. And there is a direct link between the way the American's staged the coup in 1953 and the 4th of November 1979 when the people took over the American embassy in Tehran.

So we could go on showing that there are external barriers against the transformation of the Middle East in terms of democracy. Listen to President Bush, the father. The new world order, what came out of the new world order? As soon as the Kuwaitis were brought back to Kuwait, Saddam was expelled, the order in Kuwait remained as old as it ever had been up until today. Then the people in Iraq stood up. They felt encouraged in March / April 1991 to stand up against Saddam Hussein and they would have been successful. And the Americans let Saddam Hussein use his tanks and his helicopter gun ships and he put down the uprising against Saddam Hussein with the support, at least indirect support of the Americans. What was the assessment by the time in Washington, why they let Saddam Hussein do that? The assessment was that any sort of regime change by that time, early 1991, would change the balance of power in Mesopotamia in the sense that Iran would increase her influence. An American assessment based on an assessment of what the American interest would be. And then, of course, what happened all the time in the rest of the region with American support or the only democracy in the Middle East. Since a couple of years people see what they are doing, the only democracy. And they heard the Americans, the Prime Minister saying that what Bin Laden is to the Americans, Yassir Arafat is to the Israelis. Putting the entire issue of the Palestinian uprising into the corner of the fight on terrorism.

Ladies and gentlemen, and that has undermined the very concept of democracy. The people on one hand want the change, on the other hand they do not want that sort of democracy which they saw after September 11th in the United States violating basic civil rights at the way the only democracy in the Middle East, the so called, is operating. I'm not talking about Guantanamo and other things. But you see what I mean, that the concept itself is made, the concept of democracy and then we could go on, we cannot do that for the lack of time, we could go to see what's going on in Palestine and then we come to Iraq and I do not repeat what Sadik Al-Azm said and I think he's completely right. A power which completely excluded the protection of the national museum, they were not aware of what sort of problems they would be facing. They were not aware of the nature of the state, they were not aware of the nature of changes that had to be, not aware of how grave those changes would be in the light of the history which goes back down to the Ottoman Empire and goes back to 1920 when the British already excluded the Shiite majority from taking over in Baghdad by that time against the Sunni minority. So, I'm not going to repeat what Sadik Al-Azm so well has put forward. There are basic things that have to be considered. It's the situation in Baghdad: who's going to rule in Baghdad? And the way people are going to rule it. It will no longer be a Sunni minority exclusive against many others. It will be Shiite majority and hopefully, as Sadik Al-Azm has said, they will be open to other groups, to let them participate. I'm not so sure whether this is given. I'm not trusting Ayatollah Sistani, too.

Another point is the question of religion. Of course, we have two sorts, two models so to speak. One model is the laicist system, which is the former Baathi- Laicist order, it's gone. Then we have the Islamic republic, Velayat-e Faqih. I don't think that the majority of Iranian Shiites is going this way. But somewhere in the middle the problem of religion and the role religion is playing in the future Iraqi society has to be solved. And it has not even been discussed in the preliminary constitution, it has been imposed from outside, from the Americans. There are changes from all sides and then, of course, the structure of the state. Whoever is thinking about Kosovo would come to the idea to put Kosovo back to a served dominated state, nobody. Who basically could imagine in the light of history, in the light of how Iraq in 1920 was put together to put pressure on the Kurds to come back into an Arab-dominated state from Baghdad.

Probably they will find a solution, maybe. But for the time being the federal or confederate scheme is very much outside the consciousness, the political consciousness, the political experience of most of the Arab political forces, whether they are Shii or whether they are Sunni. This is just to remind you of the complexity of the issue, which probably in the case of Iraq may be greater than in other places of the Middle East.

We look two years, or three years after fighting on communism we look on the situation in the Arab world. The regimes today as to the 13th of November 2004 are as repressive as they always have been with the consent Washington. Whether you go to Egypt, whether you go to Jordan, whether you go to Syria, whether you go to Saudi Arabia. And Saudi Arabia is probably even much more repressive than it used to be for they have now the same problem facing as the Americans: terror. That shows just the complexity to the difficulties I mentioned as far as the inner structures are concerned we have that sort of considerations which are coming from outside.

I conclude here with coming back to precisely the question which Sadik Al-Azm has put forward at the end of, or the second half of his lecture, that is Turkey. What can Europe do? We have failed, we have failed to put forward an alternative to the American policy, to the American agenda. And even the Germans for a while we were very much advanced in trying to find out, to figure out an alternative to the American agenda. What is now in our political agenda here in Germany in fence-mending with the Americans. It's not looking for, it's no fresh reproach as far as the question is concerned how to encounter the Islamic world. But, of course, the homework would have to be made by both sides, by the Europeans as well as the Arab world. And among this failure, all of a sudden a chance comes up. I totally agree, and this is the point which I have been discussing here in this country a lot of times, that the way we are reacting to the Turkish application to membership will be very indicative about the state of mind in Europe, whether we really understand that something dramatic in the sense I have been putting forward has happened in Turkey. Through history, since the republic was established in 1922, the

state was pitted against society. The state was an overall notion and society was there for the state. The state was sacred, the Turkish flag is sacred, the national anthem was considered to be sacred. And that was why human rights weren't taken into consideration. That was precisely why the Kurdish question did not exist. That was why they forbid political parties, religious political parties. The state said there is not Kurd. The state imposed itself and said we have the concept of the state which is laicist the way we understand laicism. And all of a sudden we have precisely the events since the 2nd of November 2002, is just precisely two years ago that we had a political party taking over, being voted into power not taking over, but being voted into power which the wives of whom, of the leaders are wearing headscarf which caused a tremendous problem for the secular elite whether civil or military. All of a sudden Islam comes back one way or another. Islam comes back into at least the appearance of the society. All over sudden the headscarf may be forbidden here and there, at public places, at universities, in parliament but nevertheless the leading women are wearing a headscarf making clear that this is a society now which stands up against the state saying what the real realities in the societies are. And the real realities are: there is Islam, always has been for centuries. And there are Kurds, and there are Christians and there are other, not only religious but ethnic minorities as well. So that's a different Turkey and that's precisely the way I was arguing that all of a sudden Turkey moves away in order to bring to a sincerity modernity, democracy, human rights and some sort of religion, some sort of Islam moving all the way along with the rapidity which the secular parties never have shown, with the rapidity and speed towards becoming a member in Europe. And we have to consider here in Europe whether we understand this. And now the question is whether we have a vision for us or whether we are going on to keep political decisions on the status quo. If we keep political decisions on the basis of the status quo, we shall say no to Turkey but once we have a vision of what Europe should be and the way we should cooperate and the way we should shape our relationship with the Islamic world then the European Union would have to say yes.

And, of course, at this point and I'm not going into it but I mentioned it at the very beginning of my exposé. There is the question of the Muslim minorities coming and I'm fairly convinced that once we say no to Turkey we say no to our Muslim migrants in this country. Ladies and gentlemen, that will not be the end of the Muslim migrants, that will not be the end of migration, that will be the end of Europe one day for migration and cultural change is a reality we have to face. It's something we cannot, by not means, avoid. Instead of looking over our shoulder to the Christian occident we have to look forward and how to make ourselves ready for deep futures as far as the world is concerned, as far as our environment is concerned, as far as Europe is concerned. But if we resort to evidence when it comes to the way of integration, the way of living together, the way of the Muslim migrants, most of the Muslim migrants want to live in these European societies, I come to a mixed judgement but I would end up with a notion of optimism. There are numerous examples, whether I'm in Germany or in Britain or in France or even in Holland where it's for the time being a little bit problematic, of successful integration and I think the secular way we are organizing our societies protects the Muslim precisely in the way Abdulkarim Soroush put forward. The minimalists, at least the minimalists have a chance to live in the societies as Muslims in democratic secular societies. So I think that's why the decision on Turkey in December 2004 is so crucial, it's so crucial it should be a positive one and a positive decision would end, would bring to an end this endless and sterile controversy on compatibility of Islam and democracy. It would open up political perspectives for integration of Muslims in Western democratic societies. And finally would make one optimistic that there is dynamic interaction between the EU and societies in the Islamic world to bring about change and new and constructive form of partnership in a changing international environment.

Schönen Dank
Thank you